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Abstract
The current study attempts to investigate debt and dividend
policies under the umbrella of capital structure’s theories in both
organizational types i.e. family owned business (FOB) and non-family
owned business (NFOB). Two threshold points of ownership structure
(25% & 50%) were used to distinguishing FOB from NFOB. A sample
of 280 listed firms at the KSE was collected  for the period 2002-
13.Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) was applied on panel
data to estimate the coefficients of variables. The empirical results
indicated the weak application of pecking order theory and higher
payout ratio in family firms comparatively. The study provided
explanation regarding speedier rebalancing the target capital
structure of family firms due to easier access to debt and long term
presence of the family in the firm. However, FOBs smooth dividends to
lesser extent than their counterpart NFOBs indicate lower agency
and information asymmetry problems in them. SECP as well as stock
exchanges are advised to bring required changes in corporate laws
to ensure lucid and verifiable disclosure regarding dividend policy
in their reports, prospectus and websites etc.
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Introduction:
The capital structure is the topic which has been a source of
great attraction to the research scholars since the early work of
Modigliani and Miller (1958), but only a few studies have analyzed
whether family ownership and control impact the financial policies of
corporations. In spite of the recent studies in finance literature that
explore the factors having impact on debt and dividend policies (e.g.
see Frank and Goyal, 2009 and Denis and Osobov, 2008), the relation
between ownership structure and financial policies especially in case
of FOBs and NFOBs is yet scarce. A series of financial models and
theoretical framework has been developed to explore the determinants
of dividend policy along with debt policy that ultimately affect the
corporate value of firms. Among them the most important are pecking
order and trade-off theories (Myers and Majluf, 1984) which provide
explanations regarding determining the target capital structure and
dividend policy of firms. The main objective of both capital structure
theories is to explain the factors that contribute to the financial
decisions of a firm.  Lintner’s outcome model (1956) provided the
explanations for the reasons behind stable4 dividend policy (constant
dividend per share); and argued that managers are reluctant to cut
dividend payments as it might have adverse effect of stock price;
consequently, the company’s dividend remain stable over time.
In order to achieve the objective of study, the analysis is
divided into two parts. In the first part, the capital structure decision
is focused that investigate the role of ownership in FOBs to finalize
the shape financing policy. In the second part, agency problem
regarding dividend policy is analyzed to investigate the impact of
family ownership and on dividend decisions. Taking into account the
dynamic nature of these decisions, this study explore the determinants
of stable dividend policy.
4-A number of companies follow the policy of paying a fixed amount per
share as dividend every year, irrespective
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Objectives of study
1. To test the role of ownership structure in financing
policy of family owned and non-family owned firms.
2. To examine the agency problem with respect to
ownership structure of family owned and non-
family owned firms.
3. To investigate the impact of ownership in term of
family and non-family business on dividend
policy.
4. To make policy recommendations to both  the above
said organizational types.
Review of Literature
Previous family literatures that analyzed the debt policy reveal
that debt level depends upon whether owner families make use of
control-enhancing mechanisms. Ownership control weakens the
asymmetric information problem as well as agency problem linked with
corporate financial policy. It facilitates the FOBs to access external
sources of debt financing. As family ownership reduces the agency
problem the exist between creditors and shareholders, a weaker
negative relation between current debt level and internal fund is
expected. This type of negative relation is reported in many previous
studies such as Miguel et al. 2004, and González & González, 2008.
Family owned businesses (FOBs) create long-term relationships with
financial institutions such as banks and others debt providers for
better financing terms. That is why they are less dependent on internal
sources and having fewer constraints to access external finance-debt
and equity. Therefore, weaker negative relation is expected in FOBs as
compared to NFOBs.
Target capital structure another important feature for every
organization, the speed of adjustment toward the target capital depends
upon financing decisions of the company. The previous literature of
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finance showed a few studies that are available to explain how financial
characteristics of firms that have impact the adjustment of speed
toward target capital structure. Furthermore, information regarding
speed toward target debt level helps the firms to rebalance their capital
structure adequately. The current study aims to fill the gap in family
literature by analyzing the impact of ownership control on the
adjustment of speed toward target capital structure. Öztekin &
Flannery (2009) showed through empirical evidences that the firms
with better governance and lesser agency problems rapidly approach
toward target capital structure. In family firms, due to lesser agency
problem and lower level of information asymmetric problem leads to
higher speed toward their target capital structure.
Agency theory highlights the relations between different
stakeholders as well as major and minor shareholders. Rozeff (1982)
exhibited with empirical evidence that the dividend policy of a firm is
the result of application of Trade-Off theory. He provided the
arguments that capital structure is based on the trade-off between tax
savings (benefits) and distress costs of debt. The Pecking Order
Theory states that firms prefer to issue external debt financing rather
than equity financing after exhausting internal fund. The two main
reasons for expecting higher dividend payout ratio in family firms are
the following. First, dividend payment can be applied as an instrument
of control mechanism in them which ultimately reduce agency conflict.
Respecting the aforesaid arguments, the family business likely to pay
more percentage of their net earnings as dividend to shareholders
which enhance the control mechanism-one of the key desires of family
owners. Secondly, family owned business can be used dividends to
reduce expropriations of large shareholders and for better corporate
governance practices. Taking into account the above arguments, a
higher dividend payout ratio is expected in family owned businesses
(FOBs) than non-family ones (NFOBs).
Firms that undergo severe agency conflicts may try to smooth
dividends payout to alleviate such concerns of different types of
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shareholders. On the contrary, in those firms where exist less severe
conflicts of interest and asymmetric information (family owned firms)
tend to smooth the amount of dividend payments to lesser extent.
Michaely, R., and Roberts, M.R. (2006) opined that the firms with the
least severe information and agency conflicts are less likely to altertheir
dividend policy and therefore, less likely to smooth dividends. As the
family firms being fewer constraints than the non-family firms, hence,
they are less likely to change their dividend policy.
Methodology
The main sources of our information are the annual reports,
financial statements. Basic balance sheet analyses issued by State
Bank of Pakistan (SBP) from the period spanning5 of 2002 to 2013 are
also used. The sample of study consists of 280 non-financial companies
listed at Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) Pakistan. As the current study
is conducted regarding ownership structure in connection with
financial policies, unobservable problems in the form of heterogeneity
as well as endogeneity emerged out during the estimation process.
Panel data methodology deals with heterogeneity while Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM) help to control the endogeneity. The
multi collinearity problem is the hallmarks of this type of study, t-
statistics the coefficients for the individual variables might be
insignificant. To deal with this problem Wald tests (w1 and w2) are
applied to test the joint significance of coefficients and time dummy
variables respectively. Finally, the potential misspecification of the
models is checked by two ways called Hansen J-statistic and m2
statistic.
5-Previously this type of study was conducted on 7 years time span (D. I. R.
Puerto, Julio P. García and D. Chabela de la T. O, 2010).  For more validity
the time span of current is increased up to 12 years.
Definition of Family owned business (FOB)
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A firm is said to of family owned business (FOBs1), if family
directors have managerial ownership or voting rights 25% and 50% in
the firm. 25% cut off point is proposed in the official definition of
GEEF2 by its French name. It is also in line with the definition adopted
by the Board of Family Business Network in April 7, 2008. 50%3 cut
off point is used because ownership at this level confers the
unequivocal control rights (Doidge et al., 2005). Also, particularly in
Pakistan, owners of family companies hold more than 50%
shareholdings (Attiya and Robina, 2010).
Hypotheses Formation and Specification of Models
H1:  There is weaker negative relation between internal fund and
debt in FOBs as compared to their counterpart NFOBs.
In order to test the hypothesis H1, the following model is
framed as under:
DRit = α0 + β0 DRit-1 + (β1 + γ0 FOB) IFit + µ Xit-1 +Eit ——————
————————— (1)
In line with Pecking order theory, the weaker negative
relation in family firms is expected. Therefore, the estimated
coefficients for family firms and for non-family firms are expected in
the form as (β1^ + γo^)<β1^ < 0.
H2:  FOBs adjust more speedily toward target capital structure
than their counterpart NFOBs
To test the hypothesis-2, in line with (Fama and French,
2002), the model is specified in the following way.
1 FOB is defined on both criterion i.e. (25% & 50%).
2The official definition of family business was adopted on March 27, 2008
by the GEEF and on April 7, 2008 by the Board of the Family Business
Network 3 More than 50 percent stake has been assumed to imply enough
control on decision-making.
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DR*it = a + b IFit + cXit-1 +Eit——————————————(a)
The speed is capture by the following model.DRit –DRit-1 = d
(DR*it- DRit-1) ——————————————————— (b)
Where 0< d > 1 is the speed of firms toward target capital structure
over time.
By rearranging Eq. (b) we get the Eq. (c) as under:
DRit = d DR
*
it + (1-d) DRit-1————————————————(c)
By putting the value of DR*it from Eq. (a) in Eq. (c)
 DRit = d a + (1-d) DRit-1 + bd IFit + cd Xit-1 +d Eit ————— (d)
By Putting da = α0,     βo= (1-d), bd = β1
DRit = α0 + βo DRit-1+ β1 IFit + µ Xit-1 +Eit ————————————
(e)
Adjusting dummy variable FOB = 1 for family firms and FOB = 0 for
non-family firms, the final shape of the model is as under.
DRit = α0 + β1 IFit+ (β0+ γ1 FOB) DRit-1+ µ Xit-1 +€itit —————(2)
For family firms the impact is captured (β^0 + γ
^
1) and for
non-family firms (β^0). The speed of adjustment is 1- (β
^
0 + γ
^
1) and
1- β^0 for family firms and for non-family firms respectively.
According to hypothesis-2, it is expected   (β^0 + γ
^
1) < (β
^
0
H3: There is higher dividend payout ratio in FOBs as compared to
NFOBs.
In order to test the hypothesis H3, the model is designed as
under:
DIVit = α0 + β2 DIVit-1 + (β3 + γ2 FOB) NEit + µ Xit-1 +Eit —(3)
For family firms the impact is captured (β^3 + γ
^
2) and for
non-family firms β^3. It is expected (β
^
3 + γ
^
2) > β
^
3 as per hypothesis-
3.
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H4:  FOBs have stable dividend policy than their counterpart
NFOBs
In order to test the hypothesis H4, the following model is
developed.
According to Linter’s model of target dividend, the dividend policy
is a factor of net earnings of company.
DIV*it = a + b NEit + d Xit-1 +Åit——————————————(f)
It is the fact that firms tend to fill the gap between target dividend
ratio and current level of dividend gradually. The speed can be
captured by the following model:
DIVit –DIVit-1 = e (DIV
*
it- DRit-1) ————————————(g)
Where 0< e > 1 is the speed of firms toward target capital structure
over time. By solving the equation (f) and (g)
 DRit = e a + (1-e) DIVit-1 + be NEit + de Xit-1 +e Åit ————— (h)
Put ea = α0,     β2 = (1-e), be = β3 and de = µ
DIVit = α0 + β3 NEit + β2 DIVit-1 + µ Xit-1 +Åit ————————  (i)
Adjusting dummy variable FOB = 1 for family firms and FOB = 0 for
non-family firms, the final shape of the model is as under:
DIVit = α0 + β3 NEit + (β2+ γ3 FOB) DIVit-1 + µ Xit-1 +Eit —(4)
 The impact of family firms is captured (β2
 ^+ γ3
^) and for non-
family firms (β2
^). As proposed in hypothesis-4, it is expected that (β2
^
+ γ3 )^ >β2
^.  The adjustment speed for non-family firms is e = 1- β^2 and
for family firms is e = 1-(β^2 + γ
^
3).
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Empirical Results:
Table-1
Summary Statistics &Correlation Matrix for the full sample of
financing decisions
 Panel (A): Summary Statistics for the full sample 
Variables Mean Median Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
DR it 0.743 0.708 0.361 0.110 0.990 
DIVi t 0.008 0.002 0.019 0.000 0.202 
CFit 0.060 0.053 0.191 -1.213 0.445 
SIZE it 9.159 7.927 10.120 1.325 12.478 
AR it 0.269 0.315 0.139 0.109 0.421 
INVi t 0.022 0.023 0.052 -0.721 0.046 
 Q it 0.798 0.679 0.172 0.010 8.649 
ROAit 0.192 0.181 0.169 -0.661 0.784 
In Table-1 Panel (A) provides the details of means,
medians,and standard deviations, minimum and maximum of the
variables used in the different types of analyses. The Panel (B)
contributes the correlation between the variables used in the study.
The sample consist of 280 companies (3360 observations) listed in
Karachi Stock Exchange Pakistan. The data sample is collected ranging
from the period 2002 to 2013. The DRit and DIVit are the debt ratio and
dividend ratio paid for the corresponding year t. CFit stands for
cashflow, SIZEit denotes Size is the firm; ARit is the average account
receivable, INVit denotes the net investment of firms, Qit denotes as
Tobin Q and ROAit means return on total assets.
Panel (B): Correlation Matrix for the full sample 
Variables DRit DIVit CFit SIZE  it AR it INVit Qit ROA it 
DRit 1.000        
DIV it -0.213 1.000       
CF it -0.251 0.349 1.000      
SIZE it 0.198 -0.042 0.098 1.000     
ARit -0.180 0.061 0.586 -0.163 1.000    
INVit -0.016 0.001 0.134 -0.002 0.005 1.000   
Qit  -0.320 0.356 0.379 -0.025 0.005 0.082 1.000  
ROA it -0.213 0.450 0.923 0.088 0.108 0.149 0.368 1.000 
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In Table-1 panel (A) gives the summary statistics of all the
variables of full sample used in this study. The mean values of debt
ratio (0.743) and dividend (0.008) are ranging from 0.110 to 0.990 and
0.000 to 0.202 respectively. The average value of Tobin Q is 0.798
indicates a notable gap between market and book values of firms. The
mean values account receivables and return on assets (0.269 and
0.192) provide insight of good sign regarding business operations.
Details of cash flow, size and debt can be seen in Table-1. Similarly,
Panel (B) provides summary statistics of all the variables used in the
analyses. It is noteworthy that correlation exists between independent
variables.
Figure-1 depicts the percentage distribution of family and
non-family firms at 25% and 50% threshold points. It also shows the
further percentage distribution in different sectors in family firms.
Figure-1
Distribution of family and non-family firms
PAKISTAN BUSINESS REVIEW JAN 2016
Research
996
Consumer Innovativeness Leading to Innovation Adoption
Regression Results
This segment of study depicts the results drawn from
empirical models using 25% cut off point for classification of FOBs
and NFOBs. The regression results can be seen in Table-3.
The results drawn by estimating the model (1) provides the
insight of ownership on financing behavior of corporations. The
results reveal that impact of internal fund on debt for NFOBs is (β1 = -
0.140) and for FOBs (β1 + γ0= -0.140 + 0.080= -0.060). The estimated
coefficients confirm the weak relation between internal fund and debt
and support the hypothesis-1 at 1% level of significance.
The estimated coefficients of hypothesis-2 for non-family
firms is (β^0 = 0.649) and for family firms   is (β
^
0 + γ
^
1) = (0.649 -0.025) =
0.624. Therefore, adjustment speed for family firms is 1-0.624 = 37.6%.
For nonfamily firms this speed can be captured as 1-0.649 = 35.10%.
The results are also statistically significant at 1% level.
. The estimated coefficients of hypothesis-3 for non-family
firms is (β^3 = 0.004) and for family firms   is (β
^
3+ γ
^
2) = (0.004 + 0.015 =
0.019) show significantly positive impact of net earnings on dividend
payment. The empirical results confirm the hypothesis-3.The results
support the arguments of substation effect between ownership
structure and dividend policy in terms of reducing agency conflict
such like (Goergen, et al., 2005).
The results of hypothesis-4 is supporting our expectation
i.e. family firms have stable dividend policy as compared the non-
family firms. Conversely, the family firms have slow speed toward
target dividend structure or the family firms are less likely tosmooth
their dividend policy.  The estimated coefficients for non-family firms
is (β^2 = 0.318) and for family firms   is (β
^
2 + γ
^
3) = (0.318 + 0.075 = 0.226)
show significant positive impact of previous level of dividend to current
level of dividend payment. The speed of adjustment can be computed
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as (1- β4 = 1-0.318 = 68.20%), (1-β4 – γ4 = 1-0.0.318-0.075 = 60.70%) for
non-family firms and family firms respectively. It means that FOBs
speed of adjustment lower than their counterparts NFOBs. Our results
are in line with previous studies such like (Gugler, K. 2003).
Table-3
Dividend and debt policies of family and non-family companies
(25% cut off point)
 
  Model-1 Model-2 Model-3 Model-3 
Variables Co Value SE Value SE Value SE Value SE 
constant α0 -0.046* 0.006 -0.055* 0.006 0.005* 0.001 0.004* 0.001 
DRit-1  β0 0.579* 0.005 0.649* 0.005     
CFit β1 -0.140* 0.005 -0.112* 0.005     
DIVit-1 β2     0.249* 0.002 0.318* 0.001 
NEit β3     0.004* 0.001 0.022* 0.003 
FOBCFit γ0  0.080* 0.007       
FOBDRit- 1 γ1    -0.025* 0.006     
FOBNEit γ2      0.015* 0.002   
FOBDIV it- 1 γ3        0.075* 0.002 
SIZE it- 1 µ1 0.005 0.001 0.006* 0.000 0.001* 0.000 0.001** 0.000 
ARit- 1 µ2 -0.026* 0.001 -0.026* 0.001 0.006* 0.000 0.005* 0.000 
INV it- 1 µ3 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 
Qit- 1 µ4 -0.014* 0.001 -0.016* 0.001 0.006* 0.000 0.005* 0.000 
ROAit-1 µ5 0.002* 0.001 0.002* 0.001 -0.012* 0.001 -0.013* 0.000 
T-statistics t1 -14.43       
T-statistics t2   164.62     
T-statistics t3     24.22   
T-statistics t4       124.11 
Wald Test-1 w1 6284.57 (8)  6334.57 (9)  3331.67 (8)   5381.67 (8)  
Wald Test-2 w2 227.01 (8)  217.01 (8)  217.01 (8)  111.01 (9)  
Correlation Test-1 c1 -7 .590  -7.898  -7.898  -2.898  
Correlation Test-2 c2 1.231  1.531  1.531  1.130  
Hansen h 578.78 182 538.78 162 498.72 162 398.72 162 
Speed toward Target capita l structure  NFOB = 35.10% and FOB = 37.60% 
Speed toward Target Dividend Ration  NFOB = 68.20% and FOB = 60.70% 
Table-3 shows comprehensive analysis of dividend and debt
policies of family and non-family companies at 25% cut off point.
Generalized method of moments (GMM) is used to test the hypotheses
(1-4).  The dummy variable FOB equal 1 for Family business and zero
otherwise. DRit and CF it are the debt and cashflow ratios of the
company. DIVit and NEit are the dividend and net earnings ratios of
the company. SIZEit, ARit are the size and average account receivables
of the companies. INV it shows net investment of the companies. Qit
and ROA it is the Tobin q and return on assets of companies. The
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procedure followed to classify FOBs from NFOBs is explained in section
3.1. The sample consists of 3360 observations, 280 non-financial
companies listed on Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) Pakistan for the
period ranging from 2002 to 2013. The ***, ** and * denote significance
level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. T-statistic ( t1) shows the linear
restriction under the null hypothesis H0: β1 + γ0 =0 . T-statistic (t2)
indicates the linear restriction under the null hypothesis H0: β0 + γ1   =
0. T-statistic (t3) provides the linear restriction under the null hypothesis
H0: β3 + γ2 = 0. T-statistic (t4) indicates the linear restriction under the
null hypothesis H0: β2 + γ3 = 0 w1 shows the Wald Test-1 for the joint
significance of the estimated coefficients under null hypothesis H0
(asymptotically distributed) and the value under parenthesis denotes
the degree of freedom. w2 is the Wald Test-2 for the joint significance
of the times dummies under null hypothesis H0 (asymptotically
distributed) and the value under parenthesis shows the degree of
freedom. c1is the serial correlation Test-1 of order 1 using residual in
first difference under assumption of null hypothesis (no serial
correlation) asymptotically distributed. c2is the serial correlation Test-
2 of order II using residual in second difference under assumption of
null hypothesis (no serial correlation) asymptotically distributed. h
indicates the Hansen test of over identifying restriction under
assumption of null hypothesis as no correlation between instruments
and error term and the value in parenthesis is the degree of freedom.
Robustness checks
The Table-4 is designed to check the robustness of tests that
allow us verify the validity of above presented empirical evidences on
50% cut off point. These results are slightly different from the previous.
The speeds toward target capital structure and target dividend policy
are increased which further strengthens the proposed hypotheses of
this study.
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Table-4
       Dividend and debt policies of family and non-family companies
(50% cut off point) (See detail in Table-3)
  Model-1 Model-2 Model-3 Model-3 
Variables Co Value SE Value SE Value SE Value SE 
constant α0 0.066* 0.002 0.025* 0.002 -0.015* 0.001 -0.014* 0.001 
DRit-1  β0 0.689* 0.004 0.612* 0.004     
CFit β1 -0.131* 0.004 0.871* 0.004     
DIVit-1  β2     0.242* 0.002 0.261* 0.001 
NEit β3     0.005* 0.001 0.024* 0.003 
FOBCF it γ0 -0.438* 0.005       
FOBDRit-1 γ1   -0.010* 0.004     
FOBNEit γ2     0.001* 0.002   
FOBDIVit-1 γ3       0.085* 0.003 
SIZEit-1 µ1  0.006 0.001 0.006* 0.000 0.002* 0.000 0.002** 0.001 
ARit-1 µ2  -0.016* 0.002 -0.016* 0.002 0.008* 0.000 0.005* 0.000 
INV it-1 µ3  0.003 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003 
Qit-1 µ4  -0.015* 0.001 -0.076* 0.001 0.005* 0.000 0.004* 0.000 
ROAit-1 µ5  0.002* 0.001 0.003* 0.001 -0.022* 0.001 -0.023* 0.000 
T-statistics t1 -2.43       
T-statistics t2   25.62     
T-statistics t3     24.62   
T-statistics t4       1.892 
Wald Test-1 w1 6277.67 (7)  6634.17 (9)  3341.11 (8)  5482.37 (8)   
Wald Test-2 w2 212.11 (7)  227.01 (8)   217.01 (8)  161.11 (9)  
Correlation Test-1 c1 -6.590  -6.898  -7.898  -3.119  
Correlation Test-2 c2 1.131  1.521  1.531  1.132  
Hansen h 588.88 182 548.28 162 418.79 162 399.79 162 
Speed toward Target capital structure  NFOB = 38.90% and FOB = 43.38% 
Speed toward Target Dividend Ratio  NFOB = 73.90% and FOB = 65.40% 
 
Conclusion and Discussion
The current study is an attempt to examine the impact of
ownership structure on debt and dividend policies, in terms of family
owned business (FOB) and non-family owned business (NFOB). The
study is designed to explore the family business models and its effect
on financial decisions. Two specific issues are focused regarding
different organizational types. First, the debt policy with respect to
ownership structure is addressed under the shadow of capital
structure theories i.e. pecking order and trade-off theories. These
theories are the ever hot subject matter in the finance literature.
Second, the dividend policy under the umbrella of Lintner’s (1950)
model of dividend is analyzed. Other capital structure’s theories like
Agency theory, MM theory, and Signalling and tax clientele theories
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also incorporated which offer encyclopedic theoretical background
to discussion.
Several stylized facts and unique characteristics of
corporations that are collected from prior studies to be considered to
further categories then specific firm levels. The empirical results drawn
contribute to previous finance literature regarding debt structure and
dividend decisions by taking new variable as family ownership which
provide additional explanations with respect to performance difference
between family owned and non-family owned firms.  The identification
of speed toward target capital structure and speed toward target
dividend ratio of family and non-family firms is the hallmark of this
study.
Taking into consideration the importance of previous family
literature, the capital structure theories are used to discover the
determinants of both debt and dividend policies. The dividend choices
are analyzed in term of family owned business (FOB) and non-family
owned business (NFOB) in relation with their net earnings. Based on
the empirical evidences regarding internal fund and leverage, net
earnings and dividend policy, two main findings are analyzed. First of
all, the significant negative relation between cashflow and debt ratio
indicates weak application of pecking order theory in family firms.
Furthermore, this result provides explanation that problems due to
asymmetric information are less sever in FOBs which allow them easier
access to external funds as compared to NFOBs. Also, empirical results
show lower agency problem between owners and creditors. As a
consequence, lower cost of leverage financing (Anderson, Mansi,
and Reeb, 2003).
 Second, dividend payout ratio higher in family firms provides
interpretations to outcome model of dividend (Chae, Kim, and Lee,
2009). It is argued that owner’s large stake in FOBs allow them to
pressurize managers to distribute higher proportion of net earnings as
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dividend payment to shareholders (Faccio, Lang, and Young, 2001).
In line with previous arguments of dividend preference in FOBs, it is
argued that a higher level of dividend in family companies is due to
better corporate governance structure. Therefore, the dividend
policies of family firms are in line with the free cash flow interpretation
of dividend models (Jensen, 1986). Other factors regarding the impact
of ownership structure on debt and dividend policies are explored by
using different capital structure models. These models support the
trade-off theory as well as Linter model of dividend (1956) in case of
debt and dividend financing.
These models are extended by incorporating the role of
ownership structure in terms of family and non-family firms. The results
of this study uncover the fact that the adjustment of speed toward
debt structure as well as toward dividend payout ratio is different in
family firms than their non-family counterparts. Consistent with the
hypotheses, it is concluded that family owned businesses (FOBs)
rebalance their debt level with higher speed due to easier access to
debt and long term presence of the family in the firm. Diametrically
opposite to this fact family owned business (FOB) slowly achieve
their target dividend policy. In other words, there is more stability
regarding dividend policy in family firms as compared to their
counterparts.  In addition, the reason for this empirical finding is that
FOBs consider transaction cost as a factor in devising dividend policy
(Rozeff, 1982). These results contribute additional explanations for
the difference in corporate performance of FOBs and NFOBs. For
example faster speed of adjustment toward target capital structure
could have significant positive impact on value. Similarly slower speed
toward target dividend policy indicates a positive sign of stability in
dividend policy in family owned business (FOB).
Interesting conclusions can be drawn that FOBs in Pakistan,
contrary to Asian countries, have found debt inclined rather than
liquidation. In this way, distressed borrowers could be important factor
which must be incorporated as determinant of dividend policy and
PAKISTAN BUSINESS REVIEW JAN 2016
Research
1002
Consumer Innovativeness Leading to Innovation Adoption
capital structure in Pakistan. The future research should incorporate
this factor as a determinant. Similarly the payout ratio is concluded
higher contrary to other Asian countries (O. Machek and J. Hnilica,
2014).
Recommendations
1. As it is concluded that there is weak application of pecking
order theory in family firms. Conversely, NFOBs are advised
to take measures against asymmetric information problem.
2. .It is recommended for the managers of NFOBs not to let the
firms create a wide gap between exiting and target capital
structure. Thus, do measures in this regards.
3. As being concluded comparatively stable dividend policy in
family firms, the investors are advised to prioritize their
investments in family owned companies.
4. Being regularity authorities; the Security Exchange
Commission of Pakistan (SECP) as well as stocks exchanges
are advised to monitor the companies regarding stability in
their dividend policy especially non-family business.
5. No disclosures regarding dividend policy are given in
company’s annual reports and financial statements; in this
regard regulators (SECP & stock exchanges) are advised to
bring required changes in corporate laws to insure that lucid
and verifiable dividend policies which would be disclosed to
investors. This study recommends the dividend policy
disclosures to be the evaluation criteria for SECP and stock
exchanges.
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